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I.

INTRODUCTION

Tax shelters raise difficult problems of statutory interpretation.
In her interesting article, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG,' Kristin
Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
Don Forchelli Professor of Law and Director, Center for the Study of Law,
Language and Cognition, Brooklyn Law School.
We wish to thank the participants in the University of Minnesota Tax Shelter
symposium for valuable comments, and the Federalist Society, which sponsored the
symposium. We are also grateful to Kristin Hickman and Michael Schler for their
helpful comments and to Rachel Ehrhardt for her valuable assistance as a research
assistant on this project. This paper was supported by the Dean's Summer Research
Stipend program at Brooklyn Law School.
1 Kristin Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX
REV. 905
(2007).
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Hickman explores one of them: the recent tendency of courts to apply
the rule of lenity in civil cases, potentially leading to a narrow
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) that would
undermine efforts to collect the taxes that Congress intended to
impose. We agree both with Hickman's articulation and analysis of
this problem. In this commentary, we situate more broadly the status
of tax shelters in the jurisprudence of statutory interpretation. More
specifically, we show how tax shelters are a challenge to ordinary
principles of statutory interpretation, whether or not lenity is
expanded to make it even more difficult to combat them.
Scholars and judges have made a great deal over various
differences in judicial philosophy in statutory interpretation. Most
notable is the rift between those who claim to be textualists and those
who advocate for more contextual analysis.3 We acknowledge these
differences, but believe that the problem of tax shelters would exist,
more or less in the same form, regardless of how judges approach
statutory interpretation.
At bottom, there is relatively strong consensus that the goal of
statutory interpretation is to find and enforce the intended meaning of
the legislature and that the best evidence of this intent is the language
of the statute. Tax shelters take advantage of this consensus approach
in two distinct ways. First, tax shelters take advantage of the
flexibility of statutory words by structuring transactions that arguably
come within statutory language that would license the avoidance of
taxation, albeit in a non-prototypical sense. Second, tax shelters take
advantage of gaps in legislation, where at most there is unexpressed
legislative intent. Such gaps are an especially difficult problem
because few, if any, statutory interpreters are comfortable construing
a law beyond any fair meaning of its text.
Often, tax shelters can be characterized either way. Although
they appear quaint by today's standards, it may be helpful to begin by
remembering an older generation of tax shelters. A typical example
2

The rule of lenity is the name given to the principle that "penal statutes

should be strictly construed against the government or parties seeking to enforce
statutory penalties and in favor of the persons on whom penalties are sought to be
imposed." NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 59.03 (6th
ed. 2002).
3 Most relevant here is Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism
and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2004). For an illustration of the stark contrast
between these approaches, compare WILLIAM N. ESKRDIGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994) with ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
(2006).
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might involve a passive investment by a lawyer or a doctor in an
orange grove.4 That investment would be motivated purely by the
availability of tax benefits that participating taxpayers could use to
"shelter" their professional income from taxation. One could frame
the problem posed by such a tax shelter as a failure of a hypothetical
statute to limit the sought-after tax benefits to "legitimate" farmers.5
That failure could be a result of a gap in the underlying statute (e.g.
the statute was created with farmers in mind, but fails to incorporate
such a limitation) or of ambiguity in that statute (e.g. the statute limits
the benefits to farmers, but employs a definition of farmer that could
be interpreted either to include or exclude passive investors such as
doctors and lawyers). In practice, the statutory vulnerability is likely
to fall somewhere between a distinct gap and a straightforward
ambiguity. For instance, the statute might explicitly refer to farmers,
but provide no definition of the term. A court could invalidate such a
shelter by filling the gap or by resolving the ambiguity against the
taxpayer, declaring that Congress would not have intended the doctor
in question to be treated as a farmer.
Alternatively, if courts were unwilling or unable to do either,
Congress or perhaps the Treasury Department could intervene to
prevent future revenue losses. They could do so by (i) specifying the
characteristic (in this instance a lack of active participation in the
orange grove's business so that the taxpayer is essentially purchasing
tax benefits) that makes the doctor's ability to derive the unintended
tax benefits "abusive" and (ii) using• that
characteristic to limit the
6
availability of those benefits accordingly.
Legislative or administrative action after the fact, however, is a
second best solution in many cases, since it assumes a safe harbor for
some period of time before the new laws are put in place.' Thus, if
these sorts of shelters are to be rendered ineffective, principles
4 See Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative

History and the Interpretationof Tax Statutes, 69 TEx. L. REV. 819,840 (1991).
5 Such "legitimate" farmers might include a farmer who also operates
a gas
station, but not a doctor who never lays eyes on the orange grove in question. Id.
6 Congress did precisely that by creating the passive activity loss rules. I.R.C.
§
469. The passive loss rules prevented tax losses incurred in a passive investment from
sheltering active income.
7 See Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the
Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1950 (2005) ("It is always
possible, of course, to shut down particular shelter techniques with narrowly-targeted
legislation.... The problem is that these targeted fixes are always made prospective
only. As Congress closes one loophole, tax shelter designers find other glitches in the
Code around which to build new shelters.").
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beyond the interpretation of the language of the particular sections of

the Code that govern the type of transaction in dispute must be
invoked. s Hickman provides illustrations of both gap- and ambiguitybased tax shelters in her discussion of the KPMG case, and we will use

her illustrations, among others, to make our points.
II.

BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND INTENT: WHERE TAX SHELTERS
RESIDE

For purposes of this essay, we adopt the position, taken by others,
that tax shelters are generally characterized as transactions that
appear to comply in a literal manner with the Code, but which are
designed to reach a tax result that Congress would not have intended.9

Transactions that take advantage of rules that intend to give favorable
treatment, such as deducting mortgage interest on a principal place of
residence,

0

are typically not considered to be tax shelters." Nor are

transactions that intentionally disobey the law. These constitute tax
fraud."
Tax shelters, in contrast, involve the structuring of
8 For this reason, we support the use of anti-abuse provisions to defeat tax
shelters, not only as a good idea, but probably as the only workable means of shutting
down tax shelters that fly in the face of congressional intent. In other words, "[w]hat
is wanted is a silver bullet (or perhaps a broad-spectrum antibiotic) that would kill a
wide variety of tax shelters, and do so in such a way that the government would no
longer always be playing catch up .. " Id. at 1951 (suggesting a provision that would
"disallow noneconomic losses and noneconomic deferrals through the use of foreign
(and other tax-indifferent) counterparties"). Id. at 1952. As Chirelstein and Zelenak
explain, the passive activity loss rules introduced in the 1980s in response to an earlier
wave of tax shelters provide an example of a successful anti-abuse provision. See
I.R.C. § 469 (preventing passive investment losses from offsetting active business
income).
9 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 3, at 20; Michael L. Schler, Ten More
Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor
Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 331 (2002) (responding to David A. Weisbach, Ten
Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215,218 (2002)).
10I.R.C. § 163(h)(3).
" See David P. Hariton, Response to "Old 'Brine' in New Bottles" (New Brine in
Old Bottles), 55 TAx L. REV. 397,402 (2002) (responding to James S. Eustice, Abusive
Corporate Tax Shelters: Old "Brine" in New Bottles, 55 TAx L. REV. 135 (2002)).
Hariton illustrates this principle by distinguishing between leveraged leases and leasein, lease-out, or LILO, tax shelters: "The former passes legitimate tax benefits that
have been conferred by Congress for investment in U.S. business property from one
taxpayer to another ... whereas the later [sic] purports to create tax benefits that
Congress did not intend to confer on anyone .. " Id. at 402.
12 See I.R.C. § 7201 (treating efforts to "willfully ... evade or defeat" income
taxes as felonies).
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transactions to appear lawful while thwarting the intent of the
legislature.
Which such devices should be allowed as a substantive matter is
not a question of statutory interpretation, as Professor Weisbach
points out." Nonetheless, if the successful tax shelter must at least
arguably comply with the Code and regulations, then it must do so in
light of the various tools that courts use to determine the scope of
statutes and regulations. The planner must structure the transaction
to withstand judicial scrutiny despite the fact that those who wrote the
law would likely have intended a different result.
A crucial question, then, is to what extent the courts take heed of
the intent of the legislature in the interpretation of statutes. If courts
did so to the exclusion of all other considerations, then tax shelters
would never succeed. If, in contrast, legislative intent were irrelevant,
they would always succeed. The reality lies somewhere in the middle.
Courts are generally quite concerned with discovering and enforcing
the will of the legislature. They are not in agreement, however, about
what evidence of legislative intent is legitimate to consult, and
legislative intent is not the only value to which they adhere. Other
values, such as deference to administrative agencies - including the
Internal Revenue Service (Service) - and fair notice - which
underlies the rule of lenity - also play a role. These are the
principles upon which Hickman relies in her analysis of tax shelters.
We return to them in Part IV. First, we explore briefly the role that
legislative intent plays in the interpretation of statutes.
Nearly all judges, even textualist judges who profess otherwise,
attempt to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to apply the
statute in a way that will further that intent. In fact, a Lexis survey of
judicial decisions from the 1990s found that federal courts used intent
and related words (i.e., intention, intend, etc.) within six words of
Congress or legislature more than 3000 times each year during the
decade, and that state courts did the same. 4 That amounts to a
minimum of 60,000 instances in a ten-year period.
How do courts find legislative intent? They look first to the
language of the statute. For example, in an opinion construing the
innocent infringer provision of the Lanham Act, the Fifth Circuit

13

Weisbach, supra note 9, at 218 (suggesting disputed interpretive doctrines,

such as substance over form, could simply be codified to alleviate separation of
powers concerns).
14 Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central
Role of
Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation,93 GEO. L.J. 427,453-54 (2005).
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wrote, "Our starting point in divining the meaning of a statute is the
intent of Congress. The best evidence of this intent is the language of
the statute."' 5 Pronouncements relating
language and legislative
16
intent are easy to find in judicial opinions.
This does not end the inquiry, however. It only begins to define

it. Once language comes into play, judges do not always agree upon
where ambiguities lie and how to resolve them. Consider Smith v.
United States,•17 a case
discussed in the scholarly literature on
• widely
18

statutory interpretation. In that case, the defendant had attempted
to trade an unloaded machinegun for illegal drugs and was prosecuted
for attempting to "use a firearm ...

during and in relation to a drug

trafficking offense."' 9 A majority of six justices voted to affirm the
conviction, based on the meanings of the words as revealed in a host
of dictionaries, the relationship between the statute at issue and
related statutes, and the likely intent of the legislature based on the
proliferation of guns. The majority correctly found that the act of
trading a firearm for drugs can properly be seen as using the firearm.
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the "ordinary meaning" of

"use a firearm" means to use it as a firearm, not merely as a thing of
value.

°

He, too, was correct. When we use the expression "use a

firearm" we typically have in mind using it for its intended purpose.
Smith illustrates an important point. Both the majority and dissent

claimed fidelity to the intent of the legislature. 2' They both sought to
discover that intent from the language of the statute. Yet they
15

Dial One of the Mid-South, Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 269

F.3d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 2001).
16 See, e.g., Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S.
526, 534 (2004) ("The starting
point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text, not predecessor
statutes"); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 (1981) ("The search for congressional
intent begins with the language of the statute").
17 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
18 See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of
the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the
Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 319 (1998); Cunningham & Repetti, supra note
3, at 15-16.
19 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006).
See 508 U.S. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 229 (majority opinion) ("Had Congress intended the narrow
construction petitioner urges, it could have so indicated. It did not, and we decline to
introduce that additional requirement on our own."); see also id. at 236 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Even if we assume that Congress had intended the term 'use' to have a
more limited scope when it passed the original version of [section] 924(c) in 1968...
we believe it clear from the face of the statute that the Congress that amended
[section] 924(c) in 1986 did not.").
20

21
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disagreed on what that intent was because it is possible to draw
various inferences from the language, depending upon whether one
asks about the outer bounds of the language or the most likely
intended meaning. Thus, even those who claim to rely on a statute's
language and to reject legislative intent recognize that they actually
rely on language in order to ascertainintent.
Smith also illustrates how little difference there is between the
textualists and those who purport to concern themselves more with
context. Since his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1986, Justice
Scalia's "new textualism"22 has been seen as a challenge to an intentoriented approach to statutory interpretation. Yet consider Justice
Scalia's rationale for using the "ordinary meaning rule," which is a
prominent part of his jurisprudence:
The question, at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and we
accordingly "begin with the language employed by Congress
and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."23
Scalia's reasoning is probabilistic: It is a fair bet that Congress, in
enacting statutes, would typically have in mind the prototypical
meanings of the words it uses. By adopting this assumption, one can
concern oneself with the intent of the legislature without ever looking
outside the language of the statute.
The courts frequently take ordinary meaning into account, often
as a surrogate for legislative intent.24 For example, Small v. United
States25 decided by the Supreme Court in 2005, construed a law that
makes it "unlawful for any person... who has been convicted in any
court, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year. . . to ... possess.., any firearm.",26 Gary Small had served a
prison term in Japan after having been convicted there of weapons
charges. The question was whether the statute bars those who have
been convicted in foreign courts from owning firearms or whether "in

22

The expression "new textualism" comes from Professor Eskridge.

See

William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,623 (1990).
23 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (quoting FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57 (1990) (quoting Park N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park &
Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985))).
14 For general discussion of this phenomenon, see Lawrence
M. Solan, The New
Textualists' New Text, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 2027 (2005).
" 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
26 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2005) (emphasis added).
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any court" should be understood to refer to federal and state domestic
courts. The Court relied on ordinary usage to limit the statute's scope
to those who have been convicted in American courts: "We should
apply an ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically
oriented statutes here - an assumption that helps us determine
Congress' intent where Congress likely did not consider the matter
and where other indicia of intent are in approximate balance."2
Textualists and intentionalists alike also make use of arguments
based upon coherence to interpret statutes. Justice Scalia opines:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be
determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown
to have been understood by a larger handful of the Members
of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1)
most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus
most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress
which voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the
citizens subject to it), and (2) most compatible with the
surrounding body of law into which the provision must be
integrated - a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we
assume Congress always has in mind. I would not permit any
of the historical and legislative material discussed by the
Court, or all of it combined, to lead me to a result different
from the one that these factors suggest.2
We assume, by a "benign fiction," that Congress intends to create
a code that makes some sense when the different pieces are fitted
together. Other noncontroversial tools of statutory interpretation
include the stare decisis effect of earlier court decisions interpreting
the statute and various additional canons of construction.
There is one significant aspect of textualism, though, which differs
from the approach of those judges who more comfortably
acknowledge relying on legislative intent.
Textualists eschew
legislative history as evidence of intent. In his book, A Matter of
Interpretation, Justice Scalia explains: "My view that the objective
indication of the words, rather than the intent of the legislature, is
what constitutes the law leads me, of course, to the conclusion that
legislative history should not be used as an authoritative indication of

27

544 U.S. at 390.

28 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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a statute's meaning. 2 ' He continues:
As I have said, I object to the use of legislative history on
principle, since I reject intent of the legislature as the proper
criterion of the law. What is most exasperating about the use
of legislative history, however, is that it does not even make
sense for those who accept legislative intent as the criterion.
It is much more likely to produce a false or contrived
legislative intent than a genuine one. The first and most
obvious reason for this is that, with respect to 99.99 percent of
the issues of construction reaching the courts, there is no
legislative intent, so that any clues provided by the legislative
history are bound to be false.3 °
Textualists have a particular aversion to legislative history as
evidence of legislative intent both because it is unreliable and because
it aggrandizes the role of congressional committees and floor
managers in a way that usurps the legislative process called for in
Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution.3'
Yet it is only when legislative history would be dispositive of a
case that the different philosophies would yield different results, and
such cases are few and far between. Consider, for example, United
32 a 1967 case discussed
States v. Correll,
by Cunningham and Repetti
as an example of pre-textualist legal reasoning.3 3 At issue in Correll
was the scope of section 162(a)(2) of the Code, which allows
deductions for traveling expenses including "meals and lodging"
incurred while "traveling... away from home in the pursuit of a trade
or business." The taxpayer in that case was a traveling salesman who
ate breakfast and lunch on the road, and returned home for dinner
each night. The Service had limited the deduction to the person
29 ANTONIN SCALIA,

A

MATTER OF INTERPRETATION

29-30 (Amy Gutmann ed.,

1997).
30 Id. at

31-32.

3' For exposition

of this issue, see John F. Manning, Textualism as a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997). For arguments to the
contrary, see Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of
Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2000). See also Professor Manning's
response, John F. Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to
Professor Siegel, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1529 (2000), and Professor Siegel's reply to
Professor Manning's response, Jonathan R. Siegel, Timing and Delegation: A Reply,
53 VAND L. REV. 1543 (2000).
32 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
33 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 3, at 12-13.
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whose trip requires him stop for sleep or rest, known as "the overnight
rule."

In affirming the overnight rule, the Court relied upon what it
inferred to be the intent of the legislature, based upon a number of
factors. First, the language of the statute itself suggests this limitation.
The conjunction "meals and lodging" suggests that these expenses
were intended to be a unit, and such a unit applies only when the
taxpayer stays away from home overnight. Second, at the time
Congress enacted section 162(a)(2), the Service had already taken this
position through a regulation then in place. The Court thus relied on
the canon of interpretation which holds: "Treasury regulations and
interpretations long continued without substantial change, applying to
unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have
received congressional approval and have the effect of law., 3 4 Third,
the Court found it appropriate to defer to the Commissioner since
Congress had delegated rulemaking authority to the Service, not the
courts. Fourth, the Court recognized the overnight rule as reasonably
fair. In some sense, everyone who leaves his or her house has
"traveled away from home." There is, however, no conceivable
reason why the person who works near his or her abode should be
able to deduct breakfast at the local diner while the person who works
at home should not. Similarly, why should the person who commutes
from New York to Washington in a single day be permitted to deduct
a fancy lunch at the expense of the taxpayers? Finally, the Court
relied, in a footnote, upon the legislative history of several bills that
were intended to repeal the overnight rule, demonstrating that
Congress was aware of this rule and failed to change it.35
We believe that were this case decided today, nothing very
different would happen. Most of the arguments put forward by the
Court - the coherence of the rule; its support in the statutory
language; a canon of construction taking into account a regulation in
place prior to legislative enactment; and deference to the Service would be accepted by most judges. In contrast, reliance on the
legislative history of unenacted bills is considered a weak argument at
best, and would probably carry little weight, even with those justices
willing to consider it at all. 36
34 389 U.S. at 305-06 (quoting Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938)).
35 Id. at 306 n.20.
36 Courts do, at times, take into account the failure of legislative efforts
to

abrogate rules then in place. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983) (disallowing charitable status for educational institution with policy of racial
segregation); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (exempting baseball's reserve
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Correll, however, differs from tax shelter cases in a crucial sense.
Mr. Correll did not carefully organize his life to come within the letter
of the statute granting the deduction. Rather, he made conventional
arguments concerning the interpretation of the Code, and the
Supreme Court responded with conventional statutory analysis.
Things change when tax attorneys create transactions that take into
account ex ante the tools available to a court and navigate through
them. As noted earlier,37 they might create transactions about which
the Code is silent or ambiguous and hope for a favorable ruling.
Given this dynamic, courts are likely to have a difficult time
disallowing a tax shelter whether or not they rely on legislative
history. While courts rely upon legislative intent in making their
decisions, they do not rely upon unexpressed legislative intent. The
tax planner who is able to take advantage of gaps in the Code and
regulations, or who is able to make fair notice arguments whether
dealing with a gap or an ambiguity, has a good chance of succeeding.
This is not to say that we endorse the textualist approach to
statutory interpretation in tax cases. We do not. For one thing, as
Professor Livingston has pointed out, committee reports are especially
important in the enactment of tax legislation.38 Most members of
Congress could not possibly read and analyze the texts of the bills.
Instead, they rely heavily on the descriptions of them by the relevant
committees. For another, judicially-developed doctrines, such as
economic substance3 9 and business purpose,4 ° may never have been
developed at all if courts had not been willing to elevate substance
over form. 41 These are important tools in enforcing the intended
scope of the tax laws.
Significantly, the Service's strongest tool, deference to the
Commissioner, will often not be available to the courts for reasons
that Hickman describes. Under the Chevron doctrine, not yet in place
when Correll was decided, courts are required to defer to the
reasonable interpretation of the administrative agency to which the

system from antitrust laws).
37 See infra Part I.
38 Livingston, supra note 4, at 836-37.
39 For a useful discussion of the economic substance doctrine and its evolution,
see Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000).
40 The business purpose doctrine can be traced to the Supreme
Court's Gregory
v. Helvering decision. 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (finding the absence of a nontax avoidance
motive fatal to the taxpayer's claimed tax treatment).
41 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 3, at 25-26, make this point.
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legislature has delegated the task of enforcement.42 Both legislative
silence and ambiguity may be remedied by administrative action that
reasonably comes within statutory authority: "If the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute .... ,4 What this means is that when the Service issues a

regulation that is entitled to deference, courts will curtail inquiry into
legislative intent as long as the Service's interpretation is a
"permissible" construction of the Code. In an earlier article, Hickman
argues that any equivocation about the applicability of this doctrine to
taxation should be resolved in favor of deference. 44 Of course, tax
planners can stay ahead of the curve by creating transactions about
which regulations have not been issued. The Chevron doctrine,
however, surely adds to the government's arsenal.
The problem, Hickman points out, is that deference is most
obviously justified when the agency acts through its rulemaking
authority, using notice and comment procedures; 4 but the Service
most often does not use notice and comment rulemaking. Official
Service guidance often comes in the form of either a Notice or a
Revenue Ruling. A Notice might offer a preview of forthcoming
regulations intended to address an issue or simply announce that
certain transactions will be subject to close scrutiny.4 7 Revenue
Rulings frequently provide the Service's formal view of a given
transaction structure. a While there is some debate about the type of
administrative action to which courts should defer, it would be
difficult to justify deference to the Commissioner's position when that
position is articulated for the first time in the context of litigation over
a tax shelter on which the government had taken no position before
its consummation. Thus, the Chevron doctrine is not likely to lead to

42
41

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 843 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism
in

JudicialDeference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006).
45 The Supreme Court has wrestled with the question of what
kinds of agency
action should receive deference. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 23435 (2001).
46 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7 (announcing possible
changes to
entity classification regulations).
47 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357 (announcing
increased scrutiny
of purported debt with equity characteristics).
48 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-31, 2003-1 C.B. 643 (providing guidance
with respect
to "contingent convertible" debt).
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the effective regulation of tax shelters other than to outlaw shelters
prospectively after a number of taxpayers have profited handsomely.
At that point, it remains up to the tax attorneys to find new devices
for their clients that will work for a short period of time.
III. LENITY AS A PRINCIPLE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TAX
CODE

If the Commissioner is not able to regulate tax shelters out of
existence, then the courts must get involved. Hickman's fear is that
once they do, they will be tempted to construe the Code narrowly, in
keeping with the principle of lenity. If this were to happen, the
Commissioner would remain powerless to control the interpretation
of the kinds of ambiguities and gaps that become the arbitrage of tax
planners who create shelters. In fact, any ambiguity would be
mechanically resolved in favor of the taxpayer, making it even more
difficult to convince a court to disallow a tax shelter that the
legislature would not have intended to permit.
Hickman's fear is not ill-founded. Although lenity is a doctrine
traditionally reserved for the interpretation of criminal statutes,4 9 the
Supreme Court has on several occasions applied lenity in civil cases
where the statute in question had both civil and criminal remedies.
The notion is that the Court will insist on a single interpretation of the
statute, and because there are possible criminal penalties, it is better
to interpret the statute narrowly in both criminal and civil contexts.50
In one such instance, the statute in question was a tax law, which
carried its own criminal consequences. The statute defined "firearm"
as including short-barreled rifles, but not long-barreled rifles," and
imposed a tax on guns defined as "firearms" under the statute. In
United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.,52 the Supreme Court
decided that a kit that contained a pistol that could be converted to
either a long- or short-barreled rifle did not come within the statute
and thus was not subject to taxation. Although the case arose in a
civil context, the Court noted that failure to register a firearm could
49 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358; 389 (1805).
50 For discussion of the propensity of courts to interpret dual remedy statutes in

a unified manner, see Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal
Enforcement of FederalRegulatory Statutes: The Case of The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1029 (2001); Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation
and InstitutionalChoice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209 (2003).
51

I.R.C. § 5801.

52

504 U.S. 505 (1992).

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 26:879

be criminally prosecuted under the statute, and therefore felt it
appropriate to use lenity to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the
taxpayer. 3 Since then, the Court has occasionally applied the rule of
lenity in civil cases, especially those involving statutes that have both
civil and criminal remedies. 4
We agree with Hickman that expanding the application of lenity
to the Code more generally would be a bad result, but do not think it
very likely for several reasons. First, notwithstanding these cases,
since the early nineteenth century, lenity as a doctrine has been
applied to criminal statutes, not to civil statutes. Chief Justice John
Marshall articulated the principle of lenity in United States v. Fisher,55
decided in 1805. Fisher involved the interpretation of a statute giving
priority to the United States over other creditors. Marshall held,
"where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction,
that construction is to be avoided, unless the meaning of the
legislature be plain; in which case it must be obeyed., 6 He later
explained in the same decision that the domain of lenity is limited to
the criminal context:
Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are
overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed
from, the legislative intention must be expressed with
irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a
design to effect such objects. But where only a political
regulation is made, which is inconvenient, if the intention of
the legislature be expressed in terms which are sufficiently
intelligible to leave no doubt in the mind when the words are
taken in their ordinary sense, it would be going a great way to
say that a constrained interpretation must be put upon them,
to avoid an inconvenience which ought to have been
contemplated in the legislature when the act was passed, and
which, in their opinion, was probably overbalanced by the
particular advantages it was calculated to produce. 7
Thus, the basic rule of statutory interpretation is enforcing the
intention of the legislature, and lenity comes into play only when a
Id. at 517-18.
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2005); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1,
11(2004).
55 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
53

54

56

Id. at 385.

57

Id. at 389.
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statute overthrows what were then seen as natural rights or
fundamental principles.
Second, many statutes have both criminal and civil remedies.
Among them are the antitrust laws, securities laws, the Copyright Act,
18
Only rarely does the Supreme
and various environmental laws.
Court use lenity as the basis of a decision in a civil case, however.
Much of the time, especially when there is both an administrative
agency empowered to engage in civil enforcement and a Department
of Justice bureau to which criminal cases are referred, enforcement
actually becomes more aggressive over time. For example in United
States v. O'Hagan,9 the Court interpreted the securities laws broadly
in a criminal case despite the fact that the issue had been unsettled in
both civil and criminal contexts. It does not appear that the
application of lenity in civil cases is becoming the norm.
Third, as Hickman notes, tax fraud has a strong mens rea element.
In Cheek v. United States,6° the Supreme Court held that criminal
liability for violating the Code requires proof that the taxpayer knew
the law and thwarted it. This reduces the pressure on courts to apply
lenity across the board. There is no serious likelihood that a broad
interpretation of the Code in a civil case will lead to ever-increasing
criminal liability, because only those who know their obligations can
be successfully prosecuted. We see no evidence that the Court will
revoke the Cheek doctrine.
The absence of a mechanical rule of lenity in tax shelter cases
does not mean, however, that the government will have an easy time
of it. Tax law has its own rule akin to the rule of lenity: "Setting the
tone for our statutory analysis is the principle that statutes imposing a
tax are construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer. ' , 61 Courts are
notoriously inconsistent in applying this doctrine, just as they are
inconsistent in applying the rule of lenity. 62 One problem that arises is

'8 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000) (criminal antitrust provisions); 15 U.S.C. § 15
(civil antitrust provision), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77q (criminal and civil securities
provisions), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (criminal securities provisions); Copyright Act: 17
U.S.C. § 504 (2000) (criminal and civil provisions); Environmental (Clean Water Act):
33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (c)(2) (2000) (civil and criminal provisions).
59 521 U.S. 642 (1997).

60

498 U.S. 192 (1991); see I.R.C. § 7201.

Ltd., Inc. v. Commissioner, 286 F.3d 324, 332 (6th Cir. 2002).
Compare OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583, 594 (6th Cir. 2005)
(invoking the "traditional canon that construes revenue-raising laws against their
drafter" in upholding a pro-taxpayer district court outcome) (citation omitted), and
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1123 (D. Neb. 2004)
61

61
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the determination of when in the interpretive process the principle
applies. Should courts resort to favoring the taxpayer relatively early
in the process, it will be harder for the government to prevail. If, in
contrast, courts do not apply this principle unless they have
determined that the statute is ambiguous and fail to glean legislative
intent from other inquiry, then the rule will be applied less frequently.
Typically, the rule is applied -

if at all -

in this narrower set of

circumstances.
For example, section 4471 of the Code imposes a $3.00 tax per
cruise ship passenger, imposed "either at the time of first embarkation
or disembarkation in the United States., 63 The question in Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. United States,64 was whether the tax applies
when the ship begins and ends its voyage outside of the United States,
but makes stops in United States ports as part of the voyage. After
looking at various regulations, instances of trade usage, and a few
dictionaries, the court found that the terms "embarkation" and
disembarkation" are ambiguous. The terms could mean the beginning
and end of a voyage, or getting on and off the ship at any time.
Consequently, with no strong evidence to resolve the ambiguity, the
court gave the taxpayer the benefit of the doubt.
At the same time, courts sometimes refuse to construe the Code
in favor of the taxpayer when they conclude that they have enough
information to infer congressional intent to impose a tax. For
example, in F.E. Schumacher Company, Inc. v. United States,65 the
taxpayer had filed its payroll taxes in the correct amount and within
the statutory time frame, but had not used the Electronic Federal Tax
Payment System (EFTPS), as required under the relevant Treasury
Regulation.M Section 6656 calls for penalties to be assessed for failure
to deposit payroll taxes as follows:

(interpreting the phrase "redemption at maturity" in accordance with the rule of
statutory construction that "federal tax legislation that is intended to provide relief is
to be liberally construed in favor of the taxpayer" to find that one category of
instruments satisfied the statutory requirement even though another did not), with
Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.2d 90, 95 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding
that the taxpayer "failed to satisfy" the relevant statutory requirement, "however
liberally construed"), and Freightliner of Grand Rapids, Inc. v. United States, 351 F.
Supp. 2d 718, 723 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (concluding that the taxpayer's argument failed
even if the regulation in question was "construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer.").
63 I.R.C. § 4471(c).
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8243 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 1995).
65 308 F. Supp. 2d 819 (N.D. Ohio
2004).
Treas. Reg. § 31.6302-1(h) (as amended in 2006).
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(a) Underpayment of deposits. - In the case of any failure by
any person to deposit (as required by this title or by
regulations of the Secretary under this title) on the date
prescribed therefore any amount of tax imposed by this title
in such government depository as is authorized under section
6302(c) to receive such deposit, unless it is shown that such
failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful
neglect, there shall be imposed upon such person a penalty
percentage of the amount of the
equal to the applicable
67
underpayment.
The taxpayer claimed that the penalty did not apply since it had
deposited the required funds in a timely manner. The Service argued
that by not doing so "as required by this title or by regulations of the
Secretary under this title" it came within the penalty provisions.
Relying on the plain language of the statute, the structure of the
statute, and a Revenue Ruling, which the court found helpful though
not dispositive, the court held for the government. As for the rule
that tax laws are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer, the court
made the following comment:
Although these principles inform Tax Code interpretation,
they do not authorize fragmentary exploitation of any one
section in the interest of avoiding compliance with the Code
or tax liability reduction. The Court is without doubt in this
A cohesive construction of the relevant Internal
case.
Revenue Code sections permits only one conclusion: Section
6656 authorizes penalties for Plaintiff's failure to deposit its
68
employment taxes electronically under the EFTPS.
The court further inferred that Congress had intended the
penalties to apply when the taxpayer failed to comply with the
procedures set forth in the regulations.69
Applying the principle that ambiguities in tax laws should be
construed narrowly mirrors a parallel approach in the application of
the rule of lenity. In 1961, Justice Frankfurter noted the following in
an opinion:

67

I.R C. § 6656(a).

6' FE. Schumacher, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 828.
69

Id. at 827.
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But that "rule," [i.e., the rule of lenity] as is true of any guide
to statutory construction, only serves as an aid for resolving
an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. "To rest upon
a formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death." The
rule comes into operation at the end of the process of
construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning
as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.
That is not the function of the judiciary.7 °
Thus, whether we speak of criminal statutes or tax statutes, a
court is most likely to default to a narrow interpretation only after it
has done its best to divine the intent of the legislature. Judges differ
as to where to look for such intent, and for that matter, how to
interpret the evidence they find. For that reason, results remain
uncertain in close cases.
IV. LENITY, INTENT, AND THE STATUS OF TAX SHELTER
LITIGATION

Now let us return to the KPMG tax shelters that Hickman
discusses. The shelters that are the focus of Hickman's analysis might
appear to bear no resemblance to our doctor and the orange grove
discussed at the beginning of this essay, 7 but in certain respects they
are quite similar. Like that shelter, they arguably complied with the
literal language of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions,
but produced tax results that Congress likely did not intend. Each
shelter was designed to survive a legal challenge, 72 taking into account
all of the enforcement tools available to tax authorities. They were
also susceptible to prospective intervention, which was not long in

70

Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (alteration in original)

(citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
71 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
72 Of course, some shelters do not survive challenges by tax authorities no

matter how clever their legal arguments. As described below, in the particular
instance Hickman discusses, a BLIPS shelter survived a challenge to its pro-taxpayer
interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United
States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608, 624 (E.D. Tex. 2006). Nevertheless, the same court later
determined that the complex transactions intended to implement the shelter "lacked
economic substance" and that the shelter was therefore invalid. Klamath Strategic
Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6939, 58 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
7' Regulations intended to extend retroactively to apply to the BLIPS
transaction at issue were declared invalid to the extent they attempted to apply
beyond the date on which the initial IRS Notice disapproving of such transactions was
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coming after these shelters came to light.

The first shelter, BLIPS, achieves its desired tax result by
substituting a "premium" for a "liability. 7 4 The relevant statute,
section 752, describes the effect of debt, labeled "liabilities" by ihe

statute, on the tax treatment of transactions involving partners and
partnerships.

In drafting section 752, Congress anticipated the

existence of prototypical liabilities, such as debt, in these transactions.
One outcome it specifies is that the assumption of any such liability of
a partner by a partnership will reduce the partner's basis, effectively
reducing any future losses produced by a disposition of the partner's

partnership interest.

However, neither Congress nor the Treasury

Department appears to have anticipated the use of a premium to
achieve an economically indistinguishable result.
As a result,

although there is no economic justification for treating the premium
more favorably, the BLIPS shelter exploited a statutory vulnerability
to avoid the basis/loss reduction that the use of a conventional liability
would have generated." Those preserved losses could be used to
shelter other income from taxation.
The second shelter, FLIP or OPIS, 77 takes advantage of rules
distinguishing between redemptions and dividends. Those rules were
designed to make redemption status relatively difficult to achieve so
that most transactions that could reasonably be characterized as either
dividends or redemptions would be treated as dividends unless they
fall within narrow safe harbors.
That approach reflects the
government's myopic" belief that taxpayers can be expected to seek

published. Klamath, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
74 Hickman, supranote 1, at 927.
75 See Hickman, supra note 1, at 927 n.100 and accompanying text. In fact, tax
authorities had long focused on precisely the opposite risk: that taxpayers would
aggressively seek to treat non-prototypical liabilities as "liabilities" for section 752
purposes. See Klamath, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 615-17 (describing the Service's long-time
litigation strategy of narrowly construing "liabilities" for section 752 purposes).
76 The report on the tax shelter industry published in connection
with the recent
tax shelter hearings provides a helpful description of the BLIPS transaction. See U.S.
Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and FinancialProfessionals
Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 108th Congress, Appendix A (2003) (report prepared by the
Minority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations titled, "U.S. Tax
Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals,
Four KPMG Case Studies: FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, AND SC2").
'n Hickman, supra note 1, at 929.
78 Eustice refers to this bias in favor of dividend treatment as a classic example
of "IRS Myopia" that allows taxpayers to achieve favorable results by using tax rules
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redemption treatment. By intentionally failing to qualify 79 for the
"complete redemption" safe harbor of section 302(b)(3), the
transaction achieves the default (i.e. dividend) treatment. In a
prototypical case, that dividend treatment would be undesirable, but
in this instance it allows a tax indifferent (foreign) party to shift tax
benefits to a U.S. taxpayer.8 O
A prescient Congress could, and perhaps would, have expressly
denied purchasers of BLIPS, FLIPS, and OPIS shelters the benefits
they sought. Certainly, with the benefit of hindsight, each of those
transactions, like the passive loss-generating investments of doctors
and lawyers decades ago, 81 has been the subject of prospective
intervention. A new regulatory provision sufficed to remedy the
"premium" ambiguity 82 exploited by the BLIPS shelter.8 3 An IRS
Notice 84 and, ultimately withdrawn, proposed regulations 8' rejected
the analysis underlying the FLIP and OPIS shelter, thereby closing a
86
gap in the existing statutory and regulatory framework.

intended to be pro-government in non-prototypical contexts.

James S. Eustice,

Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old "Brine" in New Bottles, 55 TAx L. REV 135, 143

(2002). A belief that was always myopic is now also somewhat dated as taxpayers
may apply the lower capital gains rates once only available to redemptions to
dividends. I.R.C. § l(h)(11).
7' The safe harbor failed to apply because the redeeming shareholders
retained a
"constructive" interest in the corporation through an option. Hickman, supra note 1,
at 930.
80 Hickman, supra note 1, at 931.
8' See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
The use of the term "liability" gives rise to ambiguity in that it could either be
interpreted narrowly to include only instruments labeled "debt" or could include any
obligation with a negative economic value. Alternatively, the failure of the statute to
address whether liabilities should be interpreted to include something that is not
formally debt but has the same economic characteristics as a liability could be thought
of as a "gap" in the statute.
"' Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(4)(ii) (2005) (defining "obligation" and thus
"liability" broadly to include not only "debt obligations" but also non-debt
obligations such as "tort obligations" and "contract obligations").
84 I.R.S. Notice 2001-45,2001-2
C.B. 129.
85 See Hickman, supra note 1, at 927 nn.100-01 and accompanying text.
"6 One could also fairly characterize the problem of whether the foreign
shareholder giving up shares in the FLIP/OPIS shelter in fact was redeeming shares or
receiving a dividend as a problem of ambiguity. Specifically, even if the safe harbor is
inapplicable, the decidedly ambiguous section 302(b)(1) "not essentially equivalent to
a dividend" standard might or might not apply to treat the transaction as a
redemption.
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There is no real question as to whether Congress would have
acted differently had the substitution of premium for liability been
commonplace, or had it been able to anticipate the cross-border
exploitation of the dividend/redemption distinction. The shelters
were designed to capitalize on the difficulty of divining, or at least of
conclusively demonstrating, that Congress intended a result other
than the one KPMG claimed the shelters produced. Had section 752
87
included the definition of liability now contained in the regulations, a
court would have had little difficulty seeing that the losses produced
by the BLIPS shelter were inconsistent with Congress' intent.
Of course, an adequately far-sighted Congress could also have
easily eliminated the ambiguity produced by the phrase "use a
firearm" at issue in the Smith case88 or specified that only persons
convicted in U.S. federal, state, or local courts would be barred from8 9
owning firearms, thereby eliminating the issue litigated in Small.
What makes tax shelters different is that had such language existed,
skilled tax planners would have replaced BLIPS with some other
transaction structure that even a paranoid Congress would be hardpressed to imagine. As the FLIP/OPIS shelter demonstrates, even in
their most cautious moments tax authorities are not particularly good
at creating rules that are not prone to exploitation by some future
taxpayer.90
Even if the encroachment of lenity that Hickman fears were not
to materialize, and even if textualism were to fall out of favor, tax
shelters like those described above would continue to bedevil tax
authorities. Exacerbating the difficulty they face when taxpayers are
able to choose the statutory battlefield is the fact that taxpayers'
characterization of a statutory indeterminacy can prove decisive. To
the extent that a taxpayer employing a shelter manages to persuade a
court that it has exploited a statutory gap, rather than an ambiguity,
tax authorities will find it difficult to prevail. For example, the
FLIP/OPIS shelter is a product of the government's focus on
taxpayers seeking redemption treatment." The highly detailed system
of presumptions and safe harbors exploited in producing the shelter
were not ambiguous so much as inadequate. 92 A court could easily
See supra note 83.
See supra text accompanying note 20.
89 See supra text accompanying
note 25.
90 That shelter took root in the context of overzealous, rather
than lax,
rulemaking. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
92 The constructive ownership rules Hickman describes are not susceptible
to
87
88
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extrapolate from the existing rules to fill the gap left by Congress and
the Treasury Department in order to invalidate the shelter. However,
courts are even less inclined to fill such gaps than they are to resolve
ambiguities against taxpayers.
The BLIPS shelter, by contrast, exploits a statutory weakness
that, like the use of the undefined term "farmer" in the hypothetical
statute discussed in Part I, can fairly be thought of as either an
ambiguity or a gap. The term is ambiguous if "liability" is viewed as
having two different meanings. On the one hand, "liability" may be
understood as referring only to debt instruments, in effect sanctioning
the taxpayer's claimed tax treatment. On the other hand, it may be
interpreted as referring to debt instruments and any economically
equivalent obligations. 93 The result is ambiguity.
However, one may take an entirely different view. One may
conclude that the language of the statute is unambiguous, but underinclusive, addressing only transactions involving a conventional debt
instrument. Taking that view, a court would be reluctant to expand
the scope of the statute to apply to the BLIPS transaction. Even a
non-textualist court open to the idea of relying on legislative history
and other contextual information to interpret a statute would be
unlikely to do so if it finds the statutory language to be clear. At the
same time, the lack of ambiguity would obviate the application of
lenity and similar principles.
Two controversial recent decisions illustrate the challenge the
government faces in defeating cleverly designed tax shelters even
when facing non-textualist judges willing to employ a broad range of
contextual evidence, including legislative history, to resolve statutory
ambiguities. Because the difference between a statutory gap and an
ambiguity tends to be slight and the consequences of classification can
be dramatically different (if an ambiguity is misclassified as a gap,
even non-textualists will reject all contextual evidence), success can
ride largely on persuading a court that a statutory flaw is an
ambiguity.
Gitlitz v. Commissioner 4 exemplifies the significance of the
classification of a statutory flaw. Justice Breyer, the lone dissenter,
determined that ambiguity existed that justified recourse to legislative

two different meanings; they simply produce favorable tax treatment that Congress
almost certainly did not intend to provide. See Hickman, supra note 1, at nn.94-95.
93 This broad interpretation is adopted by the current regulations. See supra
note 83.
94 531

U.S. 206 (2000).
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history in interpreting the statute.95 The majority, which ruled in favor
of the taxpayer, declined to rely on that legislative history. Although
that majority opinion was written by Justice Thomas, a textualist

unlikely to ever turn to legislative history to interpret a statute, he was
supported by all but one of his fellow justices, including Justice

Stevens, who has spoken out against textualist methodology.96
Moreover, the majority relied both upon legislative purpose, 97 and
98
upon the statute's enactment history. Of the eight justices forming
the majority in Gitlitz, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that
at least one declined to rely on the legislative history cited by the
dissent simply because that justice perceived no ambiguity rather than
because of a hostility to legislative history generally.
A second case involving a tax shelter relying on the same
principles as the BLIPS shelter clearly shows the impact of the

classification of a statutory flaw as a gap rather than an ambiguity. In
Black & Decker Corp. v. United States,99 the government argued that
the legislative history demonstrated that Congress did not have

transactions like the taxpayer's in mind when drafting a provision on
which the taxpayer's favorable tax treatment relied.'0

After relying

on legislative history to resolve one ambiguity in the statute,' the
court concluded that although the transaction in question may not
have been "[t]he prototypical transaction Congress had in mind in
drafting [section] 357(c)(3)" that fact "does not imply . . . that

Congress silently contemplated a case [like the taxpayer's] and
Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 221 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (noting a House Committee
report supporting the Commissioner's position).
96 See, e.g., Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.,
516 U.S.
95

254, 276-77 (1996) (arguing for the relevance of legislative history. For discussion of
Justice Stevens' views on this matter, see Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of
Legislative History in the Supreme Court,2000 Wis. L. REV. 205, 225-30.
97 Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 215 n.6 ("....
the very purpose of Subchapter S is to tax at
the shareholder level, not the corporate level.").
98 Id. at 220 n.10.
99 Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d
431, 436-37 (4th Cir. 2006).
100Like the BLIPS transaction, Black & Decker's favorable tax treatment relied
on avoiding a basis reduction triggered by a transfer of an economic liability to a
newly formed entity. To avoid the basis reduction in this case, the taxpayer needed to
ensure that the liability transferred satisfied the requirements of section 357(c)(3),
which waived the requirement of a basis reduction when payment of the "liability...
would have given rise to a deduction." Id. at 436; see also I.R.C. § 357(c)(3)(A).
101The statute failed to specify whether deductibility should be determined at the
transferor or transferee level. The court relied on legislative history to resolve this
ambiguity in favor of the taxpayer. Black & Decker Corp., 436 F.3d at 436.
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concluded that [section] 357(c)(3) should not apply."'' 2 The court
reasoned that nothing in the statute's "plain language embraces such a
limitation," and as a result there was "no ambiguity in the statute"
that would justify employing legislative history to determine whether
this transaction was the type of transaction Congress intended to
benefit from section 357(c)(3). °3
V.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that:
1. Tax shelters typically attempt to create tax benefits in
situations where the legislature did not intend to provide
favorable treatment;
2. Most judges consider the intent of the legislature in
interpreting statutes;
3. Judges are not usually willing to infer meaning beyond
what at least some reasonable reading of the statutory
language would permit;
4. At times, contrary inferences can be drawn from the
inquiry into intent; and
5. When courts cannot determine the intent of the legislature,
they resolve disputes in favor of the taxpayer as a default.
In these circumstances, we would expect the government to have
mixed success in opposing tax shelters. Notwithstanding bouts of
pessimism prompted by some failures, 1°4 the record is mixed indeed.
Government victories
have both closely followed and been closely
•
105
followed by losses.
Those wins and losses often involve the same
Id. at 437 (internal citations omitted).
I2
103

Id.

o4 See, e.g., Schler, supra note 9, at 346-47
"' Compare ACM P'ship v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997)
(finding government challenge of tax shelter transaction successful) with Boca
Investerings P'ship v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 2d 298 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding
challenge of "ACM clone" transaction unsuccessful). A similar pattern can be
observed with respect to the government's efforts to combat corporate owned life
insurance (or COLI) transactions. The government won a number of cases involving
COLI transactions. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 254
(1999). A taxpayer eventually won a COLI case. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
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litigation.
It would be difficult to identify a single culprit responsible for the

recent wave of tax shelters. Whatever contributing role it may have
played, textualism probably does not deserve the lion's share of

blame. The inevitable existence of statutory and regulatory gaps in a
system of rules as complex as today's tax laws leaves tax authorities at
a disadvantage that courts, whether textualist or not, often feel
powerless to remedy. Emerging developments such as the increased
prominence of the rule of lenity, the trend Hickman has identified,
undoubtedly create a risk that courts will be marginally less likely to

defer to the Treasury Department and the Service. Even if we are
wrong, however, and tax authorities find themselves faced with one
more obstacle in their efforts to bring an end to a particularly virulent

outbreak of tax shelter activity, that one obstacle is unlikely to turn
the tide against them.
Can anything be done to improve the Treasury's ability to collect
the taxes that Congress meant to impose? The most straightforward
tool - the adoption of an aggressive purposive approach to the
interpretation of the tax laws, regardless of the statutory language is too far outside today's jurisprudence to be a credible option.0 7 Yet

courts do have the opportunity to be more effective simply by using
tools that are readily available to them. For example, the "ordinary
meaning" canon, 1°8 which limits a statute's scope to those situations

that come within the ordinary usage'09 of the statutory language, and
therefore are more likely to be within the law's intended domain, can
well be employed to disallow tax shelters that leverage plausible, but

250 F. Supp. 2d 748 (E.D. Mich. 2003). However, both of those taxpayer victories
were successfully challenged on appeal. Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States,
314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir.
2006).
106 In addition to the appellate victories described in the prior footnote,
the
government recently enjoyed appellate success in a case involving principles similar to
those employed in the BLIPS shelter. See Black & Decker Corp. v. United States,
436 F.3d 431 (reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of taxpayer with respect
to a "contingent liability" tax shelter similar to the BLIPS transaction).
107 For
a defense of this approach, see AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE
108

(Sari Bashi trans., 2005).
See supra notes 20, 23-24, 27.

109

Ordinary usage need not refer to what would be apparent to a non-specialist.

INTERPRETATION IN LAW

It could well be taken to mean ordinary for the highly specialized intended audience
of these tax provisions. For discussion of the intended audiences for statutory
language, see William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in
Statutory Interpretation,95 Nw. UNIV. L. REV. 629 (2001).
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unusual applications of statutory language.
If courts had
demonstrated a willingness to employ that canon in this context, the
government might have pitched its argument regarding the atypical
nature of the transaction underlying Black & Decker's contingent
liability shelter differently. Rather than relying on legislative history
to divine legislative intent, the issue could have been framed as an
ordinary meaning question: was Black & Decker's transfer of bare
liabilities outside of the ordinary meaning of the statute because it
bore no resemblance to the "prototypical transaction Congress had in
mind in drafting" the statute?"1 ° As we saw above, this interpretive
doctrine is embraced by textualists and non-textualists alike.
In some ways, anti-abuse doctrines, whether statutory or
judicially-created, are examples of this approach. One way of
understanding the business purpose doctrine, for example, is that it
permits courts to distinguish between the kinds of transactions that
occur in the ordinary course of business from those that are nonprototypical and therefore less likely to come within the intended
meaning of a statute. Anti-abuse statutes and regulations draw the
same distinctions."1 These doctrines are very important, because they
permit courts to focus on a statute's purpose without looking outside
its language. Notwithstanding these tools, we have little doubt that
skilled planners will continue to find ways of thwarting legislative
intent, at least until Congress or the Treasury acts to put out fires with
respect to individual shelters. Yet we also believe that it is very much
worthwhile for the courts and the Treasury to be aware of what
interpretive tools they have and to use them in the service of
enforcing the will of the legislature.

110The court was open to the possibility that Black & Decker's transaction may
have borne little resemblance to the "prototypical transaction Congress had in mind
in drafting [section] 357(c)(3)" but concluded that without ambiguity in the statute it
had no reason to "parse the Congressional record and discern what type of business
transactions Congress originally envisioned in enacting the section." Black & Decker
Corp., 436 F.3d at 437. That "ordinary meaning" argument would have allowed the
government to distinguish between the taxpayer's transaction and a typical business
transaction without using any evidence of legislative intent other than the words of
the statute.
.. For discussion of the value of these statutes, see Ellen Aprill, Tax Shelters,
Tax Law, and Morality: Codifying JudicialDoctrines, 54 SMU L. REV. 9 (2001).

